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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the factors associated with the occurrences of US recessions over the 
period 1963Q1 to 2018Q2 using multivariate probit models. The evidence suggests that the 
probability of a recession decreases with higher profitability, as implied by the proponents of 
the Marxian tradition. Equally significant are the results that relate to manufacturing activity, 
investment, and inflation. The theoretical argument however, of those who regard the 
burgeoning growth of private credit as a factor triggering recessions, is not supported by our 
findings. Finally, interest rates, Tobin’s Q, and labour’s share of income are not statistically 
significant, hence implying that the likelihood of these being closely associated with US 
economic recessions is rather slim.  
Keywords: US recessions; profitability; probit models 
JEL Classifications: B50; B51; D33; E32 
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1. Introduction 
The rate of profit, according to Marx, is a key variable responsible for wide fluctuations in 
the economic performance of capitalist economic systems. High profitability has a profound 
impact galvanizing economic activity leading to the creation of employment and higher 
standards of living. Dwindling profitability however, ushers in a cycle of stagnation and 
recession/depression wherein investment activity stalls, unemployment increases and living 
standards decline. In the realm of his analysis Marx (1997) unequivocally seconded that the 
inherent proclivity of the rate of profit to decline when the economy is booming causes 
recurrent periods of crises and recessions/depressions in capitalism. Within the Marxian 
theory of surplus and exploitation, the profit-led character of capitalistic economies assumes 
a prominent role suggesting that investment in an economy depends on profits. As such, 
profit affects economic activity through boosting investment expenditure.  
For Keynesians, economic crises are the outcome of collapsing effective demand, 
with causality running from investment to profit. In this setting, dwindling investment 
expenditure creates unemployment which in turn stifles economic activity and consequently 
income. The notion of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) developed by Keynes is 
tantamount to the analysis of profitability and consistent with the fundamental principle on 
the direction of causality between investment and saving with the former causing the latter. 
For Keynes the MEC approach could be used to explain both short- and long-term 
fluctuations in the level of economic activity. Even though his analysis on the implications of 
falling MEC is rather succinct it does however provide significant insights and innovations.  
In identifying the causes of a falling profit rate various theories have been put forward 
by Heterodox economists. The most widely argued theory is the so called ‘wage-push’/ 
‘profit squeeze’ theory (see for instance Weisskopf, 1979; Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972). The 
rationale of this theory lies in the notion that wages increase due to workers’ bargaining 
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power whilst militancy in the 1960s and 1970s stifled capitalists’ profits which in turn led to 
recessionary bouts. In other words, the struggle of workers demanding higher wages was 
achieved at the expense of lower rate of profit. 
The post-war US economy has been characterized by two successive phases 
pertaining to the long-wave-like evolution of its economy (Tsoulfidis and Paitaridis, 2018). 
The first phase, also known as the ‘golden age of accumulation’, lasted from the mid to late-
60s and was immediately followed by the stagflation crisis that lasted until the mid-1980s. 
The second long-wave phase, also known as ‘the neoliberal era’, ushered in a period of 
economic exuberance reaching its peak just before the end of 2007. Currently, the US 
economy has been exhibiting signs of recovery, but the grim news is that the economy 
continues to resist returning to normal pre-2007 growth levels. It is even suggested that the 
current equilibrium might indeed be the new normal (Eggertsson et al., 2019).  
The US rate of profit has been exhibiting a declining trend in the post-war period. In 
the 1960s and early 1970s, the observed decline in the profit rate resulted in stagflation which 
adversely affected the living standards in the years that followed (Moseley, 1992; Tsoulfidis, 
2002). The immediate response of many governments to the emerging at the time 
recessionary cycles was the adoption of expansionary Keynesian policies – i.e. more 
government spending, lower interest rates – to deal with economic stagnation and increasing 
unemployment which inevitably led to higher rates of inflation as businesses increased prices 
at a faster rate to deal with a decreasing profit rate. In the 1980s, the emerging role of 
financial capitalists in dictating economic policies to reverse the inflationary pressures forced 
governments to resort to the implementation of contractionary policies, which in turn 
adversely affected unemployment and living standards.   
According to Tsoulfidis and Paitaridis (2018) the two distinctive long-wave phases 
described above have been consistent with a) the falling rate of US profit and the by 
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implication hypothesis of a rising rate of surplus value as well as the simultaneous increase in 
the value composition of capital, and b) the observed stagnation in real net profits. 
Furthermore, a falling rate of profit coupled with expansion of unproductive investment 
expenditures constitutes an explosive mix in the evolution of the next cycle of economic 
activity.  
Using two measures of profitability in a probabilistic framework of analysis this paper 
breaks new ground by investigating empirically the likelihood that profitability contributes to 
recession occurrences in the US business cycle. To this objective, we adopt a probit 
modelling approach for the US economy using quarterly data for the period 1963Q1-2018Q2. 
The results suggest that increasing profitability reduces the likelihood of a recession whilst 
the growth of credit, contrary to the conventional wisdom, is found to be insignificant. The 
assessment of our estimations confirms the predictive performance of our models and the 
validity of the yielding evidence.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the theoretical 
approaches encountered in the extant literature whilst Section 3 discusses the methodological 
framework adopted for the empirical investigation. Section 4 presents the data and the 
specification of the models and Section 5 discusses the results. Finally, Section 6 provides 
some concluding remarks.   
2. Theoretical background
The three dominant Marxian theories of economic crises revolve around a) the lack of 
effective demand - underconsumption theory, b) the ‘profit squeeze’ approach, and c) the 
falling rate of profit thesis. The underconsumption theory suggests that within capitalism at 
the initial monopoly-finance stage, the tendency to produce too much output will be met by 
deficient demand, i.e. not enough demand to absorb that output (see, Baran and Sweezy, 
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1966; Clarke, 1994). This theory is premised on the notion that the class system existing in 
capitalism in conjunction with the inherently unequal distribution of income adversely affects 
wages and therefore the purchasing power of the working class. As a result, the demand gap 
arising from either low consumption demand or low investment demand due to over-
accumulation of capital in view of non-profitable investment opportunities, leads to slow 
growth of economic activity and inevitably stagnation. 
The ‘profit squeeze’ approach claims that as the working class strengthens its 
bargaining power in the workplace, higher wage growth and increasing share of income put 
pressure on the profit share, hence causing a profit squeeze that may even threaten the 
viability of the system (see Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972; Boddy and Crotty, 1975; Bowles et al., 
1986, 1989, 1990; Weisskopf et al., 1987; Maniatis, 2012). 
The law of the falling rate of profit suggests that one of the unintended results of 
competition within capitalism is the excessive mechanization and capitalization (i.e., a rising 
capital-output ratio) of the labour process which destroys value created by labour during the 
process of production. This is further exacerbated in the post-war period by an increase in 
unproductive labour, squeezing further the labour’s value and surplus value, hence leading to 
a falling rate of profit. In this context, despite the rising rate of surplus value arising from 
productivity gains, the increasing organic and materialized (capital-output ratio) composition 
of capital in conjunction with the increase of unproductive labour cause the rate of profit to 
fall (Moseley, 1992; Shaikh and Tonak, 1994; Mohun, 2005).  
Despite the fact that Keynes did not explicitly addressed the impact of falling 
profitability in his analytical framework, he very eloquently related the MEC to fluctuations 
in economic activity when he wrote that “today and presumably for the future the schedule of 
the marginal efficiency of capital is, for a variety of reasons, much lower than it was in the 
nineteenth century” (Keynes, 1936, p. 308). Keynes regarded falling profitability beyond a 
6 
certain point as one of the main causes of economic depressions and in the General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money devoted two chapters (11 and 12) to provide a more 
insightful explanation of the occurrence and regularity of business fluctuations – as well as 
the depression of the 1930s – both in the short- as well as in the long-run.  
Currently, the changing landscape of capitalism has been widely attributed to the rise 
of neoliberalism, globalization, and financialization. In an attempt to describe the 
transformation of capitalism, Epstein (2005, p. 3) provided a definition according to which 
“financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies”. In this context, numerous books and academic papers have been written to 
outline the new landscape of capitalism but there is not a common agreement on either the 
definition of financialization or its significance. For Krippner (2004, p. 14), financialization 
refers to a “pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production”. In other words, the 
Marxian accumulation theory is sidelined only to give way to the notion that finance is the 
new source for profit. As such, the speculative nature of financial capital assumes a key role 
and is responsible for the propagation of crises in capitalism.  
According to Mavroudeas and Papadatos (2018), the financialization hypothesis is 
indeed a popular thesis amidst heterodox and mainstream economics, however it leads into a 
‘blind valley’. They argue that “the spectacular ballooning of the financial system during the 
recent decades of weak profitability and accumulation does not constitute a new epoch, let 
alone a new capitalism. Instead, it represents a familiar capitalist response to periods of 
weak profitability. This does not preclude the proliferation of new financial instruments, 
which lend specific new forms to a well-known capitalist process. The Marxist theory of crisis 
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and fictitious capital offers an analytically and empirically superior understanding of this 
process” (2018, p.451). 
Undoubtedly, dwindling profitability might not be the only factor that causes crises 
and stagnation in capitalist economies (Edvinsson, 2005). Ramirez (2007) for instance, apart 
from identifying deficient demand as one of the culprits for poor economic performance, goes 
on to argue that both the disproportionality in production as well as the chaotic nature of 
capitalism should be considered when explaining economic fluctuations. 
On a different note, Brenner (2006) in his critique to the theoretical assumption of the 
declining US rate of profit argued that there is a fundamental flaw in this theory as it cannot 
explain the low levels of the rate of profit for such a long period or the partially recovered 
profit from the prior decline. If the cause of the decline of the rate of profit was to be 
attributed to the increase in workers’ bargaining power due to relatively low levels of 
unemployment in the late 1960s and early 1970s, then why have profits not recovered given 
the higher levels of unemployment since the 1970s? Moseley (2005) in responding to 
Brenner’s theory of profit argued that it is distinctly different from Marx’s theory of profit 
which is predominately determined by the surplus labour of workers and has never been 
alluded to by Brenner.  
Furthermore, post-Keynesian economists dismiss Marx’s theory of value – based on 
the exploitation of labour and the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall – and instead 
argue that crises are the results of distributional factors caused by wages being too low 
(wage-led) or profits being too low (profit-led) (see, Minsky, 1986; Onaran and Galanis, 
2012;  Stockhammer, 2011). They consider debt to be a key factor that potentially leads to 
economic instability, hence arguing for a debt-led rather than an investment-led growth 
explanation of crises in capitalism. In this context, crises especially after the emergence of 
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neoliberalism in the 1980s have been mainly ‘wage-led’, wherein increasing levels of debt act 
as the compensating mechanism that provides liquidity to low-wage workers. 
On the policy front, Krugman (2015), by rationalizing the US slump in 1937-38 that 
was precipitated by the austerity policies introduced by Roosevelt, called for more 
government spending through borrowing, i.e. expansionary Keynesian policies, and not fiscal 
austerity. The traditional Keynesian argument in this regard rests in the causal dimension 
between investment and profit. For Keynes (1936), the direction of causality runs from 
investment to profit suggesting that the subjective decisions of entrepreneurs are influenced 
by ‘animal spirits’ and the expectations of the return on capital drive future investment.  
For Marxian economists however, the causal dimension between investment and profit runs 
in the opposite way with investment depending on profit and profit depending on the 
exploitation of labour and its ensuing appropriation by capitalists (Roberts, 2017). As such, 
the Marxian causal analysis is based on an explicit system of class society existing in 
capitalism and not on some ad hoc behavioural analysis of individuals that hinders our 
capacity to lucidly comprehend the laws dictate the evolutionary nature of capitalism. 
3. Methodological framework 
In so far as capitalism is closely associated with profitability which in turn depends on capital 
accumulation, the aggregate profit rate is a key variable in the context of Marxian political 
economy. According to Basu (2013, p. 293) “the profit rate is measured as the ratio of profit 
income and the capital advanced that has been used to generate that profit income. There are 
two different ways to measure the capital advanced: (a) as the historical cost value of the 
stock of capital, i.e., valuing elements of the capital stock at the prices at which they were 
purchased, and (b) as the replacement (or current) cost value of the stock of capital, i.e., 
valuing elements of the capital stock at prices at which they could be purchased in the market 
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in the current period.  On the empirical front, the majority of Marxian economists tend to use 
replacement cost valuation of the capital stock (see Moseley, 1992; Kotz, 2009; Shaikh, 
2010; Dumenil and Levy, 2011), whilst there are others who use the historical cost valuation 
(see Kliman, 2011).  
This study uses two different proxies for profitability: the net operating surplus (rate 
of profit, ROP)1, and the incremental rate of profit (IROP). More specifically, net operating 
surplus shows business income once the costs of compensation of employees, taxes on 
production and imports less subsidies, and consumption of fixed capital are subtracted 
from value added − but before subtracting financing costs and business transfer payments. 
The incremental rate of profit variable constitutes an interesting innovation in our estimations 
as it obviates the need to deal with theoretical and empirical issues arising from the 
measurement of capital stock (Alexiou et al., 2016). The underlying rationale of the way the 
incremental rate of profit is constructed, i.e. the ratio of change in real gross profits over the 
real gross investment of the last period, is predicated on the notion that recent returns on 
investment, as opposed to returns on all past investment, act as catalyst for new investment 
activity (Shaikh, 1995).  
Alexiou et al. (2016) formulate the current period flow of profits t  as follows: 
1
*   tt I (1) 
According to Equation (1), there are two sources that contribute to the current period flow of 
profits t : the profits on most recent investment 1tI   multiplied by some markup ρ, and the 
1 The literature is inundated with many ways of measuring ROP and the potential implications that the 
alternative measures might have for the economy. For instance, when considering constant capital in the 
measure of ROP, residential, government assets or other non-profit activities can be excluded. Alternative 
measures could potentially focus on the business sector and exclude the wages of public sector workers or even 
exclude the wages of unproductive workers or measure profit before or after tax. Some propose a more 
simplistic approach where ROP consists of net national income devoid of depreciation and employee 
compensation. Others argue that the way you measure ROP ala Marx does not make much of a difference in the 
case of the US economy (see for instance Dumenil and Levy, 2002). 
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stream of profits that accumulate to a firm from all other past investments 
* .  By 
subtracting lagged profits from both sides of Equation (1) we get: 
 *1 11      tt t tI  or  1 * 1Δ      tt tI (2)  
In Equation (2), the term in parentheses 
*
1 t  is expected to be smaller than the term 
1 tI , i.e. the total effect is negligible and therefore lagged profits can be safely disregarded 
(Shaikh, 1995; Elton et al., 2003, ch.18, p.14). It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 








  (3) 
This is the incremental rate of profit (IROP) and is defined as the ratio of the current change 
in gross real profits to gross real investment lagged by one period. According to Alexiou et al. 
(2016) IROP refers to short-run profitability and purports to identify indirectly the 
profitability of the leading firms (or the regulating capitals) of an economy over the years. In 
this sense, IROP becomes a more immediate regulator of investment activities, whereas the 
average rate of profit becomes the long-run regulator of investment flows. IROP is also 
thought to be closely bound up with the short-run Keynesian index of profitability, i.e. the 
marginal efficiency of capital.  
4. Data and model specifications
We explore the determinants of the probability of US recessions over the period 1963Q1- 
2018Q2 by utilizing multivariate probit models. The general form of our models is expressed 
as follows:     =   +  X + εt        (4) 
Our dependent variable R  is a binary recession indicator series defined as: 
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1,  if the economy is in a recession at time    









The binary dependent variable is constructed based on the US National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) business cycle reference dates as those are defined by NBER’s Business 
Cycle Reference Committee2. Figure 1 illustrates graphically the binary dependent variable 
(i.e., NBER’s recession periods) along with the evolution of US real GDP growth for our 
sample period. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Equation (4) includes a vector X  of independent variables accounting for potential 
determinants of a recession, consisting of: the credit-to-GDP ratio (CGDP) to capture the 
increasing role of the financial sector in the economy; the consumer price index rate (CPIR) 
as a proxy for inflation and macroeconomic stability; the purchasing managers index in 
manufacturing (MA) as a proxy for business confidence; the gross fixed capital formation 
growth rate (INVR) as a measure of investment activity; and the residential property prices 
index (HP). Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detailed description of all variables and 
sources. 
It should be noted that prior to estimating our models, we have tested our series for 
unit roots to ensure that the binary choice probabilities are stationary (Regenwetter and 
Davis-Stober, 2018). Thereby, the resulting first difference transformation ( ) of some of 
the variables used in the estimations reflect stationary processes.
We estimate five probit models (Models 1 to 5) where the independent variables 
capture many of the factors suggested by theory. Each model is estimated with an additional 
key independent variable. Model 1 includes the first difference in real interest rate (IR) to 
capture the financial conditions that affect both phases of the business cycle considering that 
2 For more details please see https://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. 
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an increase in interest rates stifles planned investment expenditures, reducing output thereby 
increasing the unemployment rate, and vice versa. Models 2 and 3 use two measures of 
profitability proxied by the net operating surplus (ROP) and the incremental rate of profit 
(IROP), respectively. Model 4 uses labour’s share of income3 (LSOI) to capture the 
bargaining power of workers in setting higher wages, and finally Model 5 includes Tobin’s Q 
(TOBQ) as a broad measure of firms’ performance which is defined as the market value of 
the company divided by the replacement value of the firm’s assets. When Tobin’s Q is above 
its long-term mean the market is considered to be overvalued and when it is below, it is 
considered to be undervalued. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the contemporaneous 
correlations and shows that high pair-wise correlation coefficients among the explanatory 
variables are not detected. 
We assess our five specifications by first examining a Wald test of whether all 
predictors’ regression coefficients are simultaneously zero and by employing the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1980; Lemeshow and Hosmer; 
1982) which is based on a comparison of observed and estimated frequencies in groups of 
observations defined by the estimated probability of the reference outcome. Further, given the 
binary nature of the dependent variable we also consider the fraction of observations that are 
actual positives (i.e., recessions) and are correctly identified as such (sensitivity), the fraction 
of observations that are actual negatives (i.e., non-recessions) and are correctly identified as 
such (specificity), and the overall rate of correct classification. It is worth noting here that 
both sensitivity and specificity depend heavily on the distribution of the estimated 
probabilities in the sample and therefore, in order to obtain the above classifications we have 
3 The labour’s share of income is a proxy that can capture many aspects of the distributional spectrum. We 
additionally attempted to employ other proxies such as wages and union density but due to discrepancies in 
terms of the frequency and the time span of the available data we were unable to incorporate these in our 
estimations. 
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used both the standard positive outcome threshold of 0.5 (50%) and additionally, as 
suggested by Wooldridge (2016, p. 530), a positive outcome threshold of 0.1216 (12.16%) 
which is the fraction of recessions in our sample.  
We additionally present the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves which are 
graphical plots illustrating the diagnostic ability of the predictive models in distinguishing 
between the true positives and negatives for an entire range of possible cut-off points. A ROC 
curve plots sensitivity against 1 − specificity while the area under the ROC curve (AUC) 
ranges from 0.5 to 1.0 and summarizes the predictive information of the ROC curve. The 
higher the AUC is, the better a model is at predicting 0s as 0s (non-recessions) and 1s as 1s 
(recessions). 
5. Empirical results and discussion 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the results of the probit regressions for our five models 
where a positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the predictor variable leads to an 
increase in the predicted probability while a negative coefficient indicates a decrease. In all 
models the common explanatory variables are found to be statistically significant with the 
exception of one. More specifically, inflation (CPIR) is statistically significant and positive 
suggesting that an increase in inflation increases the probability of recession, a finding in line 
with the theoretical argument according to which higher prices lead to reduced demand for 
products thereby causing economic activity to shrink. The proxy for manufacturing activity 
as well as business confidence (MA), is found to be statistically significant and negatively 
associated with the probability of recession. This is in line with the Keynesian approach that 
is encapsulated in the concept of ‘animal spirits’ according to which positive expectations 
about the current business conditions can significantly boost economic activity. In addition, 
the growth rate of investment (INVR) is statistically significant and negative indicating that 
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increasing investment will be expected to reduce the probability of a recession as it is 
suggested by the Keynesian multiplier effect on economic activity. Further, the significance 
and negative coefficient of the change in house prices index (ΔHP) suggests a reduced 
probability of recession when property values increase thus contributing to a less recessionary 
environment. In trying to provide a sensical explanation of this finding one can assume that 
increasing house prices might indicate that the economy has started moving up the cycle, 
hence the economy is expanding. In other words, increasing house values, affect GDP growth 
through consumer spending, the so-called wealth effect. It should be stressed however that 
many economists (such as Greenspan, 2005; Rajan, 2005; Shiller, 2007) argue that low risk 
premiums, misalign incentives for risk-taking, and high house prices might precede an 
economic crisis. Finally, an unexpected but interesting finding is that changes in the credit-to-
GDP ratio (ΔCGDP) are statistically insignificant across all estimated models. In an era 
where the severity of the Great Recession is thought to be primarily caused by ‘financial 
panics’ (Bernanke, 2018), this finding merits particular attention in so far as financialization 
might simply manifest itself as a symptom rather than as a key variable responsible for 
explaining a potential downswing in the business cycle as suggested by Marxian analysis. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Moving our attention to the additional key independent variables we notice that the 
probability of a US recession declines significantly when both proxies for profitability, i.e. 
ROP and IROP, increase (Models 2 and 3). These findings are in line with the theoretical 
arguments on both the falling rate of profit as well as the falling MEC, respectively. 
However, the measure of the third potential proxy for profitability captured by Tobin’s Q 
(TOBQ), although it bears a negative sign, it is found to be statistically insignificant (Model 
5). This might be due to the endogenous nature with respect to managerial decisions where 
underinvestment inflates Tobin's Q, hence rendering it an inappropriate measure (Dybvig and 
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Warachka, 2015). Further, the change in the labour’s share of income (ΔLSOI) is also found 
to be statistically insignificant (Model 4) thus suggesting that an increase in workers income 
might not constitute a sufficient condition that can significantly trigger a recession. Finally, 
the change in the interest rate (ΔIR) which in this context purports to also capture the level of 
risk in the US economy, is found to be insignificant (Model 1) hence suggesting that it does 
not contribute to the explanatory power of the model in predicting recessions. This finding 
can be interpreted in many ways, one of which might be the fact that the zero-low-bound 
(ZLB) interest rate environment that the US economy has been locked in for many years now, 
has rendered monetary policy ineffective (Kiley and Roberts, 2017).  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the conditional marginal effects showing the effect of a 
unit change in the mean value of the explanatory variables on the probability of a recession. 
Focusing on Models 2 and 3, the results suggest that if the mean inflation rate increases, the 
probability of a recession increases by 0.057 and 0.059, respectively, while the manufacturing 
activity index has a moderate negative effect (0.005 and 0.006). House prices have a negative 
effect of 0.026 and 0.028, respectively, whereas the growth rate of investment is found to be 
insignificant, suggesting that a unit change in its mean value has no statistically significant 
impact on the probability of a recession. Of special interest are the marginal effects of the two 
proxies for profitability, with the results suggesting that if profitability increases by one 
percent, it will decrease the probability of a recession by 0.001 and 0.015 in Models 2 and 3, 
respectively. Figures 2 and 3 present the graphs of the marginal effects of the statistically 
significant variables in Models 2 and 3 on the probability of a recession which further 
confirm the above findings. 
[Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
The lower part of Table 1 reports several statistics to assess the predictive 
performance of our models. The Wald statistics are high in all models indicating that the 
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models are statistically significant, that is, they fit significantly better than a model with no 
predictors. Further, the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit tests also indicate that the models 
fit quite well since the null hypothesis that the observed and expected or predicted 
probabilities are the same across different levels of predicted values, cannot be rejected. With 
a 0.5 positive outcome threshold, the percentage of recessions that are correctly identified 
range from 33.33% to 48.15% while the overall rate of correct classification ranges from 
89.59% to 91.40%. When using the lower 0.1216 positive outcome threshold (i.e. the fraction 
of recessions in our sample), the predictive performance of the percentage of recessions that 
are correctly identified improves substantially, at 88.89%. However, the overall rate of 
correct classification slightly decreases indicating that false predictions increase. Figure 4 
presents the ROC curves for the five models and in all cases the AUC is greater than 0.9 
indicating outstanding discrimination between the true positives and negatives for an entire 
range of possible cut-off points (Hosmer et al., 2013, p. 177). Overall, the above results 
suggest that the models perform quite well with satisfactory predictive performance. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Finally, we estimate the predicted probabilities using the reported coefficients of 
Models 2 and 3 (Table 1, Panel A). Figures 5 and 6 graph the predicted probabilities for the 
1963Q1-2018Q2 period along with NBER’s recession reference periods. We notice that 
Models 2 and 3 are able to capture all of the recently experienced US recessions further 
validating the models’ predictive performance. 
[Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
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6. Conclusions 
In the realm of Heterodox economics, the significant decline in the rate of profit over the last 
four decades has been regarded as the main culprit, hence causing wide fluctuations in 
economic activity. In this study, using a probabilistic framework of analysis we provide 
evidence supporting the view that dwindling profitability can potentially increase the 
probability of a recession in the USA. Additional evidence suggests that investment 
expenditure and sanguine business conditions can propel economic activity as well. However, 
the measure of the increased role of the financial system, i.e. the credit-to-GDP ratio, appears 
to have no direct bearing on recessions4, hence providing support to those who perceive 
financial panics as a symptom rather than a real cause of US recessions. Finally, interest 
rates, Tobin’s Q, and labour’s share of income do not appear to be closely associated with 
economic recessions in the USA. 
Marxian theory suggests that governments do not possess any real economic policies 
to galvanize economic activity in so far as these policies cannot positively affect the rate of 
profit and most importantly the ratio of unproductive labour to productive labour. In this 
setting, an increasing ratio of unproductive labour to productive labour can cause a significant 
decline of the rate of profit in the future, hence, amplifying its disastrous effects for the 
economy.  
The Keynesian analysis of profitability, via the concept of the marginal efficiency of 
capital, offers a more subtle explanation of both short- and long-term fluctuations in 
economic activity. In this context, the evolving nature of the marginal efficiency of capital 
approach reflects the fundamental principles that lend support to the causal dimension 
4 It is worth noting here that previous research has widely supported the idea that credit plays a significant role 
in business cycles and therefore the fact that the growth of credit is found to be insignificant with regards to the 
occurrences of US recessions should prompt an in-depth investigation into its effects on expansions and 
recessions rather than taken at full face value. 
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between investment and saving, with the former causing the latter. Unlike the Marxian 
framework of analysis, the Keynesian approach to the proclivity of profitability to fall in the 
long-run and the ensuing disastrous effects on economic activity has not received enough 
currency in the extant literature. For Keynes, the notion of long-run falling profitability is 
conveyed through expectations about future profitability that are reflected by movements in 
the marginal efficiency of capital which, if it dwindles, reduces the propensity to consume 
substantially and hence aggregate demand.    
Furthermore, Marxian economics suggest that, for capitalist economies to grow, 
continuous monetary advances are required by capitalists. In this context, the creation of 
credit serves as an unlimited source of finance for such as an expansion. The way credit is 
therefore channelled through the economy assumes a prominent role in the determination of 
capital accumulation. The Marxian perspective treats credit as endogenous to capital 
accumulation which is determined by credit demand. The interest rate however, is considered 
to be exogenous, determined by historical, institutional and political factors. In this 
framework, policies implemented by central banks as instruments in the distribution struggle, 
are determined by central banks as well as by the attitude of commercial banks towards 
liquidity and monetary wealth holders. Moreover, according to Marx, the existing capital 
labour conflict in the labour market determines both the rate of profit and the real wage rate. 
In contrast, the proponents of effective demand suggest that capital accumulation will be 
determined by investment decisions which will then impact profits and savings. Therefore, 
investment decisions are thought to be conditioned by both the rate of interest and the rate of 
expected profits.  
It is envisaged that future research on the interaction between monetary and real 
forces would be of a great interest to the academic community, which if considered in 
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historical perspective, will contribute to a more insightful analysis on the relationship 
between the rate of profit and economic crises.  
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Description of variables 
Variable Description Source 
R Binary recession indicator series National Bureau of Economic Research  
https://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html
and Federal Reserve Economic Data of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USRECQP#0 
CGDP Credit-to GDP ratio (total credit to 
private non-financial sector, % GDP)
Federal Reserve Economic Data of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
CPIR Consumer price index ratio Federal Reserve Economic Data of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
MA Purchasing Managers Index -
Manufacturing 
Institute for Supply Management (ISM) 
INVR Gross fixed capital formation growth 
rate (nonfinancial corporate business; 
gross fixed capital formation with 
equity REIT residential structures) 
Federal Reserve Economic Data of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
HP Residential house prices index (new 
1-family houses, per dwelling) 
Bank of International Settlements  
IR Interest rate (real) Federal Reserve Economic Data of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
ROP Profit rate (nonfinancial corporations’ 
sector) 
Federal Reserve Economic Data of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
IROR Incremental rate of profit per unit of 
investment  
Authors’ calculations 
LSOI Labour’s share of income (nonfarm 
business sector) 
Federal Reserve Economic Data of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
TOBQ Tobin’s Q  Ycharts 
https://ycharts.com/indicators/tobins_q  
RGDP Real gross domestic product growth Federal Reserve Economic Data of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Note: The sample period for all variables is 1963Q1-2018Q2 with the exception of Tobin’s Q where 




ΔCGDP CPIR MA INVR ΔHP ΔIR ROP IROR ΔLSOI TOBQ 
ΔCGDP 1.00 
CPIR 0.05 1.00  
MA -0.02 -0.02 1.00  
INVR 0.00 0.31 0.61 1.00  
ΔHP 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.07 1.00  
ΔIR 0.04 0.14 0.51 0.38 0.15 1.00  
ROP -0.09 0.03 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.18 1.00  
IROR -0.05 -0.03 0.23 0.24 -0.02 0.07 0.65 1.00  
ΔLSOI 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.40 -0.34 1.00 
TOBQ -0.00 -0.57 0.06 -0.09 0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 1.00 
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Panel A: Probit models 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ΔCGDP 0.057 0.061 0.055 0.084 0.072 
(0.174) (0.177) (0.174) (0.174) (0.169) 
CPIR 1.034*** 1.043*** 0.957*** 1.009*** 0.894***
(0.232) (0.214) (0.210) (0.201) (0.221) 
MA -0.072** -0.085** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.086***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) 
INVR -17.381** -17.305** -15.744* -18.970** -18.022**
(7.231) (8.685) (8.340) (7.663) (7.866) 
ΔHP -0.450*** -0.473*** -0.456*** -0.459*** -0.461***











Constant 1.462 2.181 2.544 2.540 2.790*
(1.879) (1.670) (1.707) (1.635) (1.611) 
Panel B: Conditional marginal effects 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ΔCGDP 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
CPIR 0.072*** 0.057*** 0.059** 0.068*** 0.064***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) 
MA -0.005* -0.005** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
INVR -1.212** -0.946 -0.963 -1.273* -1.281*
(0.610) (0.612) (0.659) (0.699) (0.693) 
ΔHP -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.028** -0.031*** -0.033***












Observations 221 221 221 221 219 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.464 0.480 0.471 0.453 0.445 
AIC 101.92     99.36 100.74   103.80 104.80    
BIC 125.71 123.15 124.52 127.59 128.52 
Log-likelihood -43.96 -42.68 -43.37 -44.90 -45.40 




















Correct recession (50%) 48.15% 33.33% 44.44% 44.44% 40.74% 
Correct non-recession (50%) 96.91% 97.42% 97.94% 97.42% 97.40% 
Correct overall (50%) 90.95% 89.59% 91.40% 90.95% 90.41% 
Correct recession (12.16%) 92.59% 88.89% 88.89% 88.89% 88.89% 
Correct non-recession (12.16%) 85.05% 84.54% 83.51% 82.99% 83.85% 
Correct overall (12.16%) 85.97% 85.07% 84.16% 83.71% 84.47% 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. p-values are given in square brackets. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Fig. 2. The graphs of the marginal effects of the statistically significant variables in Model 2 (Table 
1, Panel B) with 95% confidence intervals (grey areas). 
Fig. 3. The graphs of the marginal effects of the statistically significant variables in Model 3 (Table 
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Fig. 4. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for Models 1 to 5. A model with no 
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Fig. 5. The predicted probabilities of Model 2 with NBER’s recession reference periods. 
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